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'rlME INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Def end ant-Appell ant. 
Case No. 
11659 
BRIEF O,F RESP·ONDENT' 
NATURE OF CASE 
'l'his is an action by plaintiff, an insured member 
of a group health and accident insurance policy wherein 
tlil' Utah Association of Nurserymen was the group 
holder, against defendant, the insurance carrier on said 
policy, to recover expenses for hospitalization and medi-
rnl treatment for illness after the policy was issued. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court, Honorable Stewart 
\I. Iln11so11, sitting without a jury. At the conclusion of 
tl11• trial, judgment ·was entered in favor of plaintiff and 
c1g·aim;t defendant for the sum of $1,405.20 plus costs in 
111(• .-;nm of $19.00. 
1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the action of the lower 
court affirmed in entering judgment in favor of plaintiff 
and against defendant. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is very little, if any, disagreement regarding 
the facts of this case. Prior to the effective date of the 
group insurance policy in question the plaintiff Joseph 
Okamura and Richard D . .Martinez were partners doing 
business through a corporation known as Garden Art, 
Inc. The plaintiff and Mr. Martinez were members of thl· 
Utah Association of Nurserymen and as such becamr 
insured under a group insurance policy which the defen-
dant Time Insurance Company negotiated by and 
through its agents with said association. Said insurance 
policy was introduced at the trial of this matter and 
included herein and marked Exhibits P4 and P5. Said 
policy provides coverage for losses arising from acci-
dental injury or illness. The group policy was issued to 
become effective June 1, 1967, and the premiums thereon 
were to be paid quarterly, however, the terms of tlic 
policy and the members' individual certificate provide 
as follows: 
''Consideration, term and renewal: This policy 
is issued in consideration of the payment of the 
premium in advance of the effective date, and 
may be continued in force by payment of the 
premiums within 31 days of any premium due 
date.'' 
2 
The initial payment for the coverage of both the 
plaintiff and Mr. Martinez was paid by a check dated 
April 25, 1967, drawn on Garden Art, Inc. by Mr. Mar-
tinez dated October 5, 1967 (PS) in the amount of $98.70 
and mailed October 7, 1967, direct to the company in 
:'.\rilwaukee, Wisconsin. The due date of the second quar-
terly premium was September 1, 1967; said check was 
for deposit by the defendant on 11 October 
19G7; ten days after the expiration of the 31 day grace 
period, or 41 days after the due date. 
The third quarterly payment on behalf of the plain-
tiff, in the amount of $71.85 (Pl) (excluding the portion 
of the premium attributable to Martinez), was dated the 
bth of February, 1968, and mailed on the 7th of Feb-
nrnry, 1968, this check was stamped for deposit by the 
company in Milwaukee, Wisconsin on the 14th day of 
11\·bruary, 1968: 44 days after the expiration of the 31 
<lay grace period which was December 1, 1967, (R5, 20, 
:i8, 72) ; the company thereafter by a letter dated the 
20th of February, 1968, (D16), thanked the plaintiff for 
the check and requested information regarding the policy 
1111mber so the company could credit plaintiff's account 
with the payment. 
The plaintiff was not, in fact, notified that his policy 
hacl hee11 cancelled until after receipt of a letter dated 
F\•liruary 29, 1968, (D17) from the defendant company 
on approximately March 4, 1968; this letter dated the 
of February, 1968, (Dl7) contained a check in the 
a111 1qmt of $71.85 from the defendant to the Okamuras 
3 
representing a refund of their premium payment and i11. 
formed Mr. Okamura his policy had been cancelled De. 
cember 1, 1967. This notification was received 95 day, 
after the date of cancellation; 24 days after receipt of 
the third quarterly premium by the company mailed hy . . 
2\lrs. Okamura; and 13 days after the letter wherein thP 
company acknowledged receipt of the payment anrl 
thanked the Okamuras for the same. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT CLEARLY INTENDED 
BY ACCEPTING 0 VE RD U E PREMIUM 
PAYMENTS TO CONTINUE PLAIN'l1IFF'S 
INSURANCE COVERAGE. 
As stated above, the first and only notice which Mr. 
Okamura received regarding his policy coverage from 
the company and the alleged cancellation thereof, was 
by letter dated February 29, 1968, (D17), informing him 
that he no longer had coverage and in fact tendering hark 
his premium payment in the amount of $71.85. This letter 
was received approximately on the 4th day of March, 
1968, some 95 days after the date of the alleged cancclla 
ti on of said policy; 24 days after the receipt by the com 
pany of the premium check which was negotiated; and 
13 days after the letter wherein the company acknowledg-
ed receipt of the payment from the Okamuras aml 
thanked them for the same (D16). 
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It is the general rule with respect to policies requir-
ing tho periodical payment of premiums and providing 
for a forfeiture for failing to pay on the day named, 
that if the insurer customarily receives overdue pre-
mium payments from the insured and thereby induces 
him to believe that a forfeiture will not be incurred by 
a delay in the payment of premiums it cannot insist 
011 a forfeiture for delay induced by such custom. 43 
Am.Jur 2nd, Insurance, Section 1139 et. seq. 
Generally speaking, in the absence of notice by the 
insurer within a reasonable time before the time of 
paymc>nt of an intention to discontinue a custom of 
\\'Hi\'ing compliance with provisions as to payment, an 
i11sma11ce company cannot avoid the effect of the custom 
by a refusal to accept payment in accordance with the 
rnstom. There is no dispute to the fact that Mr. Okamura 
liad received no notice of the alleged cancellation after 
the expiration of 31 day grace period to wit: 1 December, 
191i7, until the letter dated February 29, 1968. The course 
of custom which was established by the defendant com-
pany and its acceptance of the late quarterly payment 
in October, 1967, which was due September 1, 1967, in-
dnn•d the plaintiff to believe that he in fact was covered 
hr insurance; the company had taken no affirmative 
stpp:,; to inform .J\Ir. Okamura that his policy had been 
(·nw·elled. 
5 
A forfeiture for non-payment of premiums is not 
favored in law, and courts are prompt to seize upon 
circumstances which indicate an election to waive the 
forfeiture. Since forfeitures are not favored, it has been 
held that unless the circumstances show a clear inten-
tion to claim a forfeiture for non-payment of premium, 
none ·will be enforced. Appleman, Insurance Law And 
Practice, Volume 15, Section 8403 et. seq., Benatti 'L'S. 
John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Company, (1937) 
8 N. E. 2d 551, 290 Ill. App. 438. Any course of action 
which leads the insured to believe that an extension has 
been granted for the payment of premiums and that in 
the meantime a forfeiture will not be incurred, con-
stitutes a waiver. Trarelers Protectfre Association Of 
America 1.:s. Jones CCA Fla. (1937), 91 F2d 337. 
This Supreme Court in Cooper vs. Foresters Under-
writers, Inc. 2 Utah 2d 373, 275 2d 675, 1954, reiteratNl 
the Utah rule that an insurance company, which by any 
course of conduct induces in the mind of an insured an 
honest belief reasonably founded that strict compliance 
with the stipulation in the contract for prompt payment 
of premiums will not be insisted on, waives its right to 
a forfeiture for non-payment of premiums. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAIVED THE AUTO-
MATIC FORFEITURE PROVISION OF ITS 
POLICY AND IS THEREBY ESTOPPED TO 
ASSERT THE SAME. 
In general, any act, declaration, or course of deal-
ing hy the insurer with knowledge of the facts constitut-
i11g a cause of forfeiture or a breach of a condition in the 
poliey, which recognizes and treats the policy as still 
in force, and leads the person insured to regard himself 
as still protected, will amount to a waiver of the for-
feiture provision; and will estop the insurer from insist-
ing on the forfeiture or setting up the same as a defense 
when sued for a subsequent loss. Moreover, slight acts 
of an insurance company may constitute a waiver of tech-
nical defenses to liability on the policy. 43 AmJur 2nd, 
Supra Section 1092 et. seq. 
In Old Surety Life Insurance Company vs. Miller, 
3:33 P.2d 504 (1958) (Okla), the court held that notwith-
anding the fact that the policy provided that it could 
ht> reinstated after lapse upon the payment of premiums 
due, plus evidence of insurability, the insurer by its past 
ronduct in accepting reinstatements of the policy without 
evidence of insurability was estopped from denying 
conrage when the insured sent a premium to the com-
11n11y shortly before his death without furnishing evi-
deuee of insurability. 
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The court stated : 
"In 20 Am. Jr. Insurwnce, Section 800, it is said: 
'It is clear that a proYision for forf ei tu re or sus-
pension of an insurance policy for non-payment 
of premiums or assessments, or for a breach of 
a condition or warranty, is inserted for the bene-
fit of the insurer, and it may waive such a provi-
sion or be estopped to deny its breach * * * and it 
may a provision after, as well as before, 
a f orf e1ture has occurred. * * * ' '' 
See also Pacific Mutua,l Life Insurance Co. vs. McDowell, 
141 Pac. 273 (Okla.), Continental Insurance Co. of N.Y. 
vs. Hall, 137 P.2d 908. 
And in Nels on vs. National Guaranty Life Co. 
(1933), 131 Cal. 669, 21P.2d1022, the court held that an 
insurer accepting payments late in previous months in-
duced insured to believe late payments would be received 
in discharge of installments, and therefore, waived pro-
visions respecting forfeiture until specific notice was 
given. See also Vinther vs. Simset Mut. Life Ins. Co. 
(1936), 11 Cal. 118, 53 P.2d 182. 
In the case at hand, the insurer made no effort 
whatsoever to contact the plaintiff and notify him that 
his coverage had been cancelled until ninety-five days 
after the cancellation date of plaintiff's policy. The 
company, in fact, negotiated plaintiff's check (P-1), and 
1Jy letter dated February 20, 1968, acknowledged receipt 
of the same and made no mention of the al-
leged cancellation of said policy to plaintiff's prejudice. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that based on the actions 
of the defendant insurer to wit: Complete failure to 
notify the plaintiff that his coverage had been terminat-
ed; acceptance of the second quarterly payment some 
forty-one days after the due date; and the acceptance 
of the third quarterly payment forty-four days after the 
l'Xpiration of the thirty-one day grace period; and sub-
sequent confirmation of the receipt of the payment dated 
February 20, 1968; a clear indication of defendant's in-
tent to waive its forfeiture provision and continue 
was evidenced. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN 
D. GARY CHRISTIAN and 
J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Respondent 
9 
